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Academic literature on counterinsurgency (COIN) is rich, and includes theories 
that delineate how to fight insurgents and case studies on historic and contemporary 
conflicts. In practice, however, waging a successful COIN campaign remains one of the 
toughest forms of warfare and, more often than not, results in defeat. 
This paper compares the theoretical stages in COIN—population engagement, 
stabilization, and the creation of a viable state1—with the challenges of winning these 
battles and linking them to victory in practice, focusing particularly on recent U.S. 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. It argues that, operationally, the United States 
Government faces several challenges to achieving victory in COIN, including the 
deployment cycles of U.S. forces, resources of civilian agencies, organizational cultures 
of civilian and military actors, and the status of the Host Nation’s government. These 
problems, while important to acknowledge, do not have easy fixes and will most likely 
continue to plague U.S. COIN initiatives in the future. 
Theory: The Actors, Battles and Main Objective of COIN
All wars have battles, or incremental steps, and the main objective which wins the 
war.  In theory, the battles should link together to win the war.  COIN is no exception; 
however, the actors, battles, and main objective in the war look significantly different 
than in conventional war. 
COIN models typically describe the key actors and their relationship to one 
another as either a triangle or a diamond. The COIN triangle contains three actors: the 
1 For a more in depth discussion on the different theoretical stages in COIN, see: Heather S. Gregg, 
“Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency,” Parameters, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
Autumn 2009, pp. 18-31.
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government, the insurgents, and the population. The COIN diamond adds international 
influences to the equation.2 Most agree, therefore, that the key actors in COIN are: the 
Host Nation’s government and military; the population; the insurgents; and the outside 
actors that aid either the government or the insurgents.
Insurgencies arise when the relationship between the government and the 
population breaks down, and a counter-state movement (the insurgents) forms to 
challenge the legitimacy of the government. Insurgents build support and resources by 
enticing or coercing the population to its cause. The population, in return, provides 
shelter, legitimacy, and a base of recruitment for insurgents. Insurgents, in other words, 
need the population in order to survive and flourish. Likewise, a state’s government is 
unlikely to succeed over the long haul without the tacit or direct support of the 
population.3  International actors step in to bolster the existing government by providing 
military and financial aid to the state. Likewise, sympathetic international actors may also 
provide support to insurgents.   
Most scholars agree that the first battle in COIN is for the Host Nation’s 
government and military (including U.S. forces acting in support of the Host Nation) to 
“win” the population’s support and thereby begin to separate the population from the 
insurgents. The first battle of COIN, therefore, is a battle between the government and the 
insurgents for the support of the population. Ultimately, whichever side wins the 
population, wins the battle.   
2 See, for example: “Counterinsurgency,” Cizendium, available at 
http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Counterinsurgency, as of February 3, 2010.
3 For more on cause of insurgency, see; David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 
Westport: Praeger, 2006; Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 
Washington, DC; Potomac Books, 2005; U.S Army/Marine Corps Field Manual on Counterinsurgency 
(FM 3-24), Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2007.
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In the battle for the population, their support is won by demonstrating the positive 
intentions of the military, U.S. forces and the Host Nation, and working with the 
population to provide better safety, services, opportunity, and hope for the future. 
Winning the population’s support requires working with the population to understand its 
needs and vulnerabilities. This battle is a process that involves dialogue, compromise and 
establishing relationships with the population. 
Once the government and military begin to separate the population from the 
insurgents and win them towards their side, the next key battle in COIN is stabilization. 
The objective in stabilization is to keep the population’s support while working on 
developing the capacity and sustainability of the state.  Stabilization is typically divided 
into “pillars,” or key functions of a state that need to be restored or developed in order for 
the state to be viable over the long haul. Broadly, these pillars involve governance, 
security (both internal and the ability to defend the state from external threats), rule of 
law, and the economy, including the physical infrastructure needed for a growing 
economy.4 Stabilization also requires developing human capital and reestablishing a 
relatively harmonious society. War torn countries often suffer from “brain drain,” the loss 
of its human capital, and are socially fractured from fighting; the battle of stabilization, 
4 The U.S. Army Field Manual in Stability Operations names six core tasks: establishing civil security, 
establishing civil control, restore essential services, information engagement, support governance, support 
economic and infrastructure development. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations, 
Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2008, pp. 3-1 to 3-19; The State Department has five tasks: 
security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well being, governance and participation, and 
economic stabilization and infrastructure [development], Stability Operations, p. 2-5; The Center for 
Strategic International Studies Post Conflict Reconstruction Project names four pillars of Stability 
Operations: security and public safety; economics and social progress; governance and participation; 
Justice and reconciliation, “Post Conflict Reconstruction Project,” Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/, as of January 12, 2009; The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) names five 
pillars: safe and secure environment; rule of law; stable democracy; sustainable economy; social well-
being, Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations, edited by Robert M. Perito, 
Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007, p. xxxiv.
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therefore, needs to emphasize building human capital and healing society in addition to 
developing the capacity of the state. 
Transitioning from population engagement to the sustainability of the state is 
perhaps the greatest challenge in COIN because it is the point when, in theory, military 
and civilian responsibilities meet and the military should, in theory, hand off most non-
military capacity building responsibilities to civilians. The U.S. Army Stability  
Operations Field Manual calls this collaboration “the whole of government approach.”5
Ultimately, for counterinsurgencies to succeed, the security, governance, and 
economic viability of the Host Nation need to be strengthened so that it can stand on its 
own, defend its borders, and provide for its citizens; this is the main objective in COIN. 
Recent scholarship suggests that a viable state should perform ten essential tasks: rule of 
law; a monopoly on violence (use of force); administrative control within the 
government; sound management of public finances; the creation of citizenship rights 
through social policy; the provision of infrastructure services; formation of a market 
economy; management of public assets; effective public borrowing (national debt); and 
investment in human capital (education, vocational training, etc.)6 Creating a viable state, 
therefore, requires fostering good leadership and governance, fiscal responsibility, 
developing the capacity of the population, educating the population on their rights and 
responsibilities as citizens, and building the bureaucratic capacity and accountability of 
the government.  
5Stability Operations, pp. 1-3 to 1-6. 
6 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fizxing Failed States, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 
124-162.
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Some argue that democracy is the goal of state and nation building.7 However, 
others debates this goal, suggesting that efforts to create “good enough governance” and 
foster decision-making are important steps that can work towards a functioning state in 
the near run and pave the way towards democracy down the road.8 In order to achieve the 
long term goal of a viable state, it is important to have a vision for the form of 
governance appropriate for the Host Nation. 
In theory, developing a viable state requires the aid and guidance of outside actors
—other countries, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and technical experts—who 
can educate the government on best practices and help hold them accountable for their 
actions. Developing a viable state also requires commitment from its citizens and 
educating the population on its rights and responsibilities as citizens, including voting, 
civic participation, and taxation; these are also necessary ingredients for a viable state to 
take hold in the long run. 
COIN in Practice 
Despite the theoretical contributions of academia to understanding COIN, fighting 
these battles in practice and linking them to victory remains a vexing challenge. This 
section highlights several gaps between theory and practice in COIN, focusing 
particularly on recent U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Although most practitioners of COIN agree that populations are the center of 
gravity in the conflict and, therefore, need to be engaged and co-opted to the side of the 
7 For example, James Dobbins et al, America’s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq, Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2003; Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations, edited by Robert 
M. Perito, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007, p. xxxiv.
8Clare Lockhart, “Prepared Testimony: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” October 17, 2009, 
available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/LockhartTestimony090917a.pdf, as of October 3, 
2009.
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government, the current deployment cycle of U.S. troops in support of COIN operations 
hinders victory in this battle.9  Population engagement takes time; it is a process that 
involves dialogue, iterative meetings, learning about the population, building rapport, and 
trial and error. U.S military deployments, however, are short. U.S. Special Forces deploy 
for three to six months, and conventional forces deploy for between six months to one 
year. In 2007, President Bush extended the deployment of conventional forces to 15 
months to help accommodate “the Surge” strategy in Iraq. While the Surge was deemed a 
success in turning events in Iraq towards stabilization and allowed troops to build 
relationships with the population, extending the deployment was extremely unpopular 
domestically, was criticized for further straining the military, and was done away with 
roughly a year after its implementation.10
In addition to deployment cycles that are not ideal for population engagement, the 
Relief in Placement/Transition of Authority process (RIP/TOA) in the U.S. military has 
hindered success in the battles of population engagement and stabilization. The RIP/TOA 
process is usually short, around two weeks, and typically hands off an Area of 
Responsibility from one entire unit to the next, as opposed to staggering rotations within 
units. Under this system, the population is confronted with an entirely new unit every 
three months to a year, depending on deployment cycles, and this cycle requires each new 
unit to learn the population’s key leaders, needs and vulnerabilities.11  The U.S. military 
9 There are still some who disagree that populations are the center of gravity. See, for example, Gian P. 
Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” Parameters, Vol. 39, No. 3, Fall 
2009, pp. 1-13. 
10 Ann Scott Thomson and Josh White, “Strained Army Extends Tours to 15 Months,” Washington Post, 
April 12, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/04/11/AR2007041100615.html, as of February 4, 2010.
11 For discussions on the RIP/TOA process and its effect on COIN, see: “Company Command: Building 
Combat-Ready Teams,” August 2009, available at http://srv1.tomoye.com/_layouts/Ecco//adl/en-
US/25486/file/2052/MilSpace%20Article%20Army%20Magazine.pdf as of February 5, 2010; and “The 
Small Wars Council (blog),” available at http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?
t=3951&page=2, as of February 5, 2010. 
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has initiated efforts aimed at mitigating the effects of the RIP/TOA process on the COIN 
environment, such as the Human Terrain System, which accumulates knowledge on the 
population and staggers its deployments.12 However, short, total rotations of U.S. troops 
remain a challenge for the battle of population engagement. 
Another major challenge in executing a COIN campaign is delineating and 
coordinating the roles and responsibilities of different actors. In theory, the whole of 
government is required to win a COIN war and the roles of actors are clear: the military 
provides security, trains and advises local forces, and defends the Host Nation’s borders 
if necessary; while civilian agencies provide humanitarian assistance, build the capacity 
of the government, and develop the economy. 
In practice, however, the roles and responsibilities of different actors are blurred, 
leading to gaps and redundancies in efforts; this confusion is the result of several factors. 
Resources, for example, present a major challenge for U.S. civilian agencies performing 
their COIN roles in practice. The U.S. Department of State (DoS) receives a fraction of 
the annual budget relative to the Department of Defense (DoD).  For 2011, DoD is 
allocated $548.9 billion dollars, while the DoS is given just over 56 million, a sum which 
is an improvement over past budgets.13  Alongside significantly greater financial 
resources, the DoD out mans the DoS exponentially, with nearly 1.5 million active duty 
troops and another 1.45 million reservists compared to the State Department’s 11,500 
12 “Human Terrain System,” Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Terrain_System, 
as of February 5, 2010.
13 State is also allocated another 53 million from the Recovery Act. See: “Budget of the U.S. Government, 
Fiscal Year 2011,” The White House Office of Budget and Management, February, 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview/, as over February 8, 2010. For past budgets, see: 
“Budgets of the United States Government,” available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/browse.html, 
as of February 8, 2010. 
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Foreign Service Officers (FSOs).14  Moreover, the U.S. military is unparalleled in its 
ability to move large numbers of troops and materiel around the world, both by air and 
sea, giving it an operational edge over its civilian counterparts. The resource 
disadvantage of the DoS greatly hinders its ability to perform its roles in a COIN 
environment.
In addition to budget and manpower discrepancies, there are also substantial 
cultural differences between the DoD and civilian agencies that affect roles and 
responsibilities in COIN environments and have hindered cooperation. After action 
interviews with Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) members in Iraq—an initiative to 
coordinate efforts between the military, civilian agencies, and local leaders—cited 
cultural differences between DoS and the DoD as an obstacle that had to be overcome in 
that COIN environment. The Small Wars Journal Blog also contains a lengthy discussion 
on the challenges of coordinating work between DoS country teams and U.S. military 
units, given different command structures, missions and training.15 These cultural 
differences have led to a lack of cooperation and confusion over roles and responsibilities 
in COIN environments.
Furthermore, many civilian agencies in the United States are not accustomed to 
deploying, particularly in semi-permissive environments, which has presented another 
challenge for the whole of government approach. For example, the DoS has a culture of 
14 “United States Armed Forces,” Wikipedia, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_armed_forces, as of February 8, 2010; “United States 
Department of State,” Wikipedia, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_State, as of February 8, 2010.
15 For PRTs, see: “Iraq PRT Experience Project: Interview #39,” United States Institute of Peace  
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/histories/iraq_prt/39.pdf, as of February 8, 2010; for the 
blog, see: “Insights on DoD/Country Team Cultures?” Small Wars Journal Council Blog, available at 
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/archive/index.php/t-6683.html, as of February 8, 2010.
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deploying but it does not typically compel FSOs to deploy to specific embassies. A 2007 
decision by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice to mandate FSOs to deploy in Iraq was 
the first assigned deployment since 1969; an angry FSO was reported to have equated the 
compelled deployment to “a potential death sentence.”16 Other civilian agencies in the 
U.S. government are unaccustomed to deploying and have had to made cultural and 
structural adjustments to allow for the rotation of personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, 
including the Department of Treasury, the Department of Agriculture and the Department 
of Justice. Overall, PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan have had difficulty filling their 
civilian requirements.17
Furthermore, leadership and chain-of-command differ between the military and 
civilian agencies hindering cooperation and coordination of efforts. While some civilian 
organizations, such as the Department of State, have a clear chain of command, other 
civilian participants, like NGOs, are structured differently and most do not have an 
operational chain of command like the military’s. Different organizational structures 
create a challenge for unity of command in a COIN environment. Actions and protocols 
that may be clear in one community may not be clear in another. Moreover, some 
agencies may not recognize the authority of others. For example, the war in Afghanistan 
is a multi-national effort that is led by NATO, but also has various countries’ civilian 
agencies participating in PRTs (including South Korea, which is not a NATO country), 
the Host Nation’s leadership, and NGOs, some of which refuse to coordinate with NATO 
16 Karen de Young, “State Dept. To Order Diplomats to Iraq,” Washington Post, October 27, 2007, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/26/AR2007102602417.html, 
as of February; “Compelled Iraq Duty Angers US Envoys,” Los Angeles Times, November 1, 2007, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/01/world/fg-state1, as of February 8, 2010.
17 Rusty Barber and Sam Parker, “Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams While Drawdown 
Looms: A USIP Trip Report,” United States Institute of Peace, available at 
http://www.usip.org/resources/evaluating-iraq-s-provincial-reconstruction-teams-while-drawdown-looms-
usip-trip-report, as of February 10, 2010. 
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forces because they believe that compromises their neutrality.18  The mosaic of civilian 
and military domestic and international actors in Afghanistan has created a complicated 
picture of command and unity of effort.19  
These challenges, along with an insecure environment, have compelled the U.S. 
military to execute a wide array of tasks in a COIN environment, many of which they 
have not been trained to perform.  In Iraq, military officers had to act as mayors, establish 
law, mediate conflicts, restart local economies, provide health care, establish public 
sanitation, and negotiate with tribal and other local leaders.20 While U.S. troops showed 
amazing adaptability and innovation, other U.S. departments have experts that are trained 
in these various skills, but lack the budgets and the culture of deploying into semi-
permissive situations necessary for working in a COIN environment. 
Another distinction between theory and practice in COIN is the sequencing of 
short and long term goals. In theory, the short and long term goals of COIN are distinct 
yet, in practice, they are fluid and non-sequential. Building a viable state begins with 
actions taken in the earliest stages of a COIN campaign.  The U.S Army Field Manual on 
Stability Operations (FM 3-07) emphasizes that Stability Operations begins in the earliest 
stages of engagement: 
For many agencies and organizations, stability operations are considered as part 
of broader efforts to reestablish enduring peace and stability following the 
cessation of open hostilities. For military forces, however, stability tasks are 
executed continuously throughout all operations. Executed early enough and in 
18 Antonio Donini, “Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Afghanistan Country Study,” Feinstein International  
Center Briefing Paper, June 2006, available at http://humanitarian-
space.dk/fileadmin/templates/billeder/dokumenter/Seminar_12_juni/Donini--
Humanitarian_Agenda_2015--Afghanistan_Country_Study.pdf, as of February 9, 2010.  
19 For a discussion on confusion over chain of command, see: “Small Wars Council Blog,” available at 
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/archive/index.php/t-6049.html, as of February 9, 2010.
20 See, for example: James A. Gavrilis, “The Mayor of Ar Rutbah,” Foreign Policy, November/December 
2005.
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support of broader national policy goals and interests, stability operations provide 
an effective tool for reducing the risk of politically motivated violence.21 
In other words, actions taken in the near term need to have the main objective of 
COIN in mind—the creation of a viable state—and take actions that work towards that 
goal or, at least, do not contradict it. 
In the early stages of COIN, the environment is usually non-permissive, requiring 
the military to establish security before civilians can begin work. The military, therefore, 
is usually the first to engage the population, the first to supply aid and begin development 
projects, and the first to empower leaders and work through them to build trust and 
rapport with the population. Military units, however, usually have specific missions for 
their deployments and these missions can conflict with the bigger battles. For example, 
missions to kill or capture High Value Targets (HVT) can often be counterproductive in 
building trust with the local population, especially if civilian casualties or collateral 
damage occurs as a result of these operations. In response to the increasing use of drones 
to kill HVTs in Pakistan, insurgency expert David Kilcullen argues that:
The drone campaign is in fact part of a larger strategic error — our insistence on 
personalizing this conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Devoting time and 
resources toward killing or capturing “high-value” targets — not to mention the 
bounties placed on their heads — distracts us from larger problems, while turning 
figures like Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban umbrella group, 
into Robin Hoods. Our experience in Iraq suggests that the capture or killing of 
high-value targets — Saddam Hussein or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — has only a 
slight and fleeting effect on levels of violence. Killing Mr. Zarqawi bought only 
18 days of quiet before Al Qaeda returned to operations under new leadership.”22
In practice, therefore, focusing the tactical fight on the bigger, long term COIN picture 
remains a challenge, and deconflicting missions with the battles of COIN requires 
21 Stability Operations, p. 1-3.
22 David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Below,” New York Times, 
May 16, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?_r=1, as of 
February 5, 2010.
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patience, planning and the ability to consider the second and third order magnitude 
affects of actions taken in the short run. 
Finally, in theory, COIN is done on behalf of and in support of the Host Nation’s 
government. In practice, however, the United States has enacted COIN campaigns in 
countries with non-existent governments, or regimes that are corrupt and illegitimate. 
The United States began both of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by deposing the 
countries’ regimes. In theory, therefore, neither of these wars began as 
counterinsurgencies. However, the governments that the United States and its allies 
established in Iraq and Afghanistan have both struggled with legitimacy in the eyes of 
some of its citizens, and both governments have been under attack from insurgents since 
their inception. In practice, therefore, both of these conflicts became counterinsurgencies. 
The United States and coalition forces have had a much more difficult task in these 
conflicts because they have had to create governments almost from scratch. It is possible 
that this undertaking will lengthen the amount of time and effort that needs to go into 
these countries to create a viable state.
Bridging the Short and Long Term Goals of COIN in Practice
The preceding description of operational challenges for the United States in its 
COIN environments presents an array of possibilities for mitigating these problems; some 
of these, however, are more easily fixed than others. 
First, and perhaps most obvious, the U.S. military needs to be better educated on 
both the battles and the objective of COIN. Following the initiation of U.S. operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military has undertaken several important initiatives to 
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educate its troops on tactical and operational imperatives in a COIN environment. The 
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps drafted FM 3-24, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
in 2006; COIN academies were established for incoming troops in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan; the U.S. Marine Corps created the Center for Advanced Operational Culture 
and Language at Quantico in 2007; the Joint Irregular Warfare Center was established at 
U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2008; the U.S. Army drafted FM 3-0 on Stability 
Operations in 2008; and numerous courses have been added in COIN and Irregular 
Warfare as part of Professional Military Education.  
All of these initiatives are important for better preparing U.S. troops to 
successfully fight COIN battles. However, the U.S. military needs to reinforce these 
educational initiatives and build on them. COIN is not a new form of warfare for the 
United States. Valuable lessons were lost from our efforts in Vietnam, El Salvador, 
Colombia, and further back from our operations in the Philippines, and Cuba at the turn 
of the 20th century. Studies in COIN need to be standard education in U.S. military 
academies, Professional Military Education, and U.S. War Colleges in order to be 
prepared for the inevitability of engaging in this type of warfare in the future.   
The deployment length and cycle of U.S. forces in COIN environments does not 
have an easy fix, but there is room for improvement. Extending deployment lengths was a 
social and political misstep for the DoD under the Bush administration in 2007, one that 
is unlikely to be repeated. Similarly, moving from total rotation of units as a whole to 
staggered rotations is also unlikely, especially with ground troops that see unit cohesion 
as paramount in battle. However, the U.S. military has some options that could improve 
its operational knowledge of the COIN environment. Similar to the Human Terrain 
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System, the U.S. military could continue to improve the way it gathers, maintains, and 
shares intelligence. The January 2010 Center for a New American Security report on 
intelligence gathering in Afghanistan illustrates this point, arguing that, “because the 
United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical 
brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to 
answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people 
we are trying to protect and persuade.”23  The report makes several suggestions for 
improving intelligence gathering, maintenance, and sharing in Afghanistan in order to 
better know and engage the population. 
Coordinating efforts between the U.S. military and civilian agencies also does not 
present easy fixes; however, there are options for improvement. Clearly the DoS needs a 
bigger budget and greater manpower to execute its missions in current U.S. COIN 
initiatives.  Realistically, however, the DoD will always have a preponderance of 
resources over civilian departments in the United States. Focusing on rectifying this 
discrepancy is unlikely to succeed. 
Rather than trying to achieve parity in resources between the U.S. military and 
civilian agencies, initiatives to improve coordination and cooperation should focus on 
improving the civil-military gap in COIN operations. U.S. military and U.S. civilian 
agencies need to train together, including sending civilians to U.S. military training 
facilities and officers and senior enlisted to civilian training sessions. Every effort should 
be made to build relationships and trust between actors prior to deploying.  Moreover, 
efforts should be made to establish more longstanding relationships between government 
23 Major General Michael T. Flynn et al, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in 
Afghanistan,” Center for a New American Security, available at http://www.cnas.org/node/3927, as of 
February 12, 2010. Quote taken from p. 4.
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agencies and the U.S. military, especially between DoD and DoS. Currently the National 
Defense University allows civilian employees of the government to attend school with 
U.S. military officers. More opportunities like this should be created to allow for 
relationships to build between civilian and military leaders.
Finally, leadership and chain-of-command need to be improved in COIN 
environments in order to harmonize efforts. As with the other problems identified, this 
issue does not have an easy fix. Currently, the DoS is given lead in stability operations, 
yet it does not have the budget or manpower to fulfill this obligation.24 The DoD has the 
budget and manpower, but does not have the legal authority to lead stabilization. A 
possible, but unlikely, fix would be to match capabilities with authority, which would 
place the DoD in change of stabilization. While this makes sense from a resource 
perspective, it presents cultural and perceptual problems. Culturally, stabilization is 
largely the domain of civilians; giving this responsibility to the U.S. military might prove 
unpalatable to the military, which may not want this role, and to civilians, who may not 
want to give up this role in COIN operations. Perceptually, placing the military in charge 
of stabilization, state reconstruction and nation building could give the impression of a 
U.S. military occupation, which may be unproductive in a COIN environment.  However, 
without matching capabilities to responsibilities, coordinating COIN efforts in 
stabilization is likely to be hindered. 
Despite the operational challenges that the U.S. Government faces in COIN 
environments, Iraq has seen considerable progress in security and development, and is 
cautiously moving towards a viable state. Afghanistan, while a long way from stable, is 
24 NSPD-44 “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” December 
7, 2005, available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html, as of February 12, 2010.
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beginning to show signs of improvement. Progress in both of these conflicts demonstrates 
that the United States can function and possibly achieve victory in a COIN environment, 
but operations could be improved by addressing critical barriers in both the U.S. military 
and civilian agencies. 
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